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Abstract:  What accounts for the discrepancy between the microfinance impact claims of development 
practitioners and the far smaller impacts found in experimental studies?  We demonstrate in a simple 
theoretical framework why "before-and-after" observations of practitioners overstate microfinance 
impacts and why estimations in some recent randomized trials understate the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT).  Our empirical study uses a unique data set from eastern Nepal to study the 
impact of microfinance in villages where microfinance did not previously exist. We find that 
approximately three-fourths of the apparent impact of microfinance observed by practitioners is an 
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Microfinance emerged in the 1970s as an effective strategy to increase credit access 
among the poor in developing countries who were routinely shunned by formal lenders and left 
to borrow from informal money lenders at elevated interest rates. The growth of microfinance 
since this time has been unprecedented.  The 2014 Microcredit Summit reports that in 2011 
there were 203 million microfinance borrowers in the developing world, among these being 
116 million of the world’s poor living on less than $1.25 per day.1   
Yet even with the tremendous resources that have flowed into microlending, there has 
been substantial disagreement regarding the impact of microfinance.  Anecdotal evidence from 
practitioners in the field tends to overwhelmingly report growth in enterprises, income, and 
improvements in household welfare after borrowers take microfinance loans.  Academic studies 
are more mixed.  While some studies have found substantive impacts of microfinance on 
household income, consumption, and poverty reduction (Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Gomez and 
Santor, 2003; Khandker, 2005; Berhane & Gardebroek, 2011; Imai et al., 2012; Field et al., 
2013), many studies find only modest or even no impact from microfinance (Morduch, 1998; 
Coleman, 1999 and 2002; Dingcong et al., 2008; Roodman & Morduch, 2009; Karlan & Zinman, 
2011; Giné & Mansuri (2011); Angelucci et al., 2012; Attanasio et al., 2011; Augsburg et al., 
2012; Banerjee et al., 2013; Crépon et al., 2013).2 
We demonstrate in a simple theoretical framework that the discrepancy between 
practitioners and academics stem from two factors.  First is the presence of unobserved shocks 
affecting the timing with which a given borrower takes a microfinance loan. These phenomena, 
which may be related to economic opportunities or changes in self-motivation, are generally 
unobservable to both practitioners and researchers, but are complementary to microfinance 
borrowing and enterprise investment.  We show that because borrowers have an incentive to 
take loans at the same time that these opportunities or increases in self-motivation arise, a large 
portion of the gain in enterprise and household welfare that practitioners observe before and 
after microfinance loans is illusory, not properly accounting for the counterfactual.   
Second, we demonstrate that the impact estimates of many recent experimental and 
quasi-experimental studies are likely to underestimate the average treatment effects of 
microfinance.  A major shortcoming of even some of the most celebrated microfinance impact 
studies (e.g. Coleman, 1999; Karlan & Zinman, 2011; Augsburg et al. (2012); Banerjee et al., 
2013) is that these studies were implemented in areas where considerable microfinance lending 
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already existed among the treated population when new microfinance was made available in the 
experimental design.  Such studies are forced to obtain impacts on marginal borrowers induced 
into taking new microfinance loans as part of the implemented research design.  While the 
authors of these papers are generally careful to qualify their results as impacts limited to 
“compliers,” they are often taken by the development community to represent the average 
impact of microfinance generally, not simply the average impact of microfinance on the last 
borrowers in an area to take microfinance loans. 
Unlike many types of interventions where an estimate on later compliers presents a 
reasonable approximation to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), such as a 
health intervention where impacts on the human body of a drug is likely to be independent of 
treatment order, we demonstrate why the impact on late takers of microfinance should be lower 
than that of the first.  The reason is that being an early taker of microfinance is positively 
correlated with borrower productivity.  This productivity in our model is based on hidden 
economic opportunity that is made up of the sum of two unobservable components: a fixed 
ability component for each borrower and an idiosyncratic measure of economic opportunity 
that varies for each potential borrower in each period.  Based on the confluence of these two 
factors, borrowers who take loans in early stages are more likely to possess a higher base level 
of productivity than those who take up loans in latter stages; hence on average they will realize 
a higher level of impact from borrowing.  Although similarly difficult to quantify, the error 
from inferring average microfinance impacts across the entire population of borrowers from 
these marginal borrowers may be no less grave than the well-known biases of borrower self-
selection or attrition that researchers have been careful to address in the past. 
Recognizing the potential problems with carrying out microfinance impact studies in 
areas with heavy existing microfinance lending, Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, & Parienté (2013) 
present results of a randomized microfinance experiment in Morocco carried out in a region in 
which virtually no microfinance existed before the experiment.  Treated villages were subject 
to the promotion of group-lending based microfinance.  Research results from the study show 
that access to credit resulted in expansion of enterprises and increased profitability, although 
increases in profits appear to be limited to agricultural enterprises.  Interestingly, however, 
their results show that MFI expansion and increased profitability were realized at a cost: As 
labor was reallocated to microenterprises, increased profits in these enterprises were offset by a 
3 
 
decrease in wages earned in the labor market, so that the net change in income and 
consumption in these households is insignificant even two years after rollout. 
 Our study is similar to Crépon et al. (2013) in that it is one of the first efforts to study 
the impact of microfinance in a rural area previously untouched by microfinance.  But in 
contrast to Crépon et. al., our study uses non-experimental data, employing two different types 
of estimation.  First we use an event study (RETRAFECT) methodology (Retrospective 
Analysis of Fundamental Events Contiguous to Treatment—see McIntosh et al., 2011) to 
analyze dynamic changes in the probabilities of fundamental events within an event window 
over the years surrounding treatment.  We also employ more conventional difference-in-
difference estimations, which are better at gauging single-parameter impacts.   
Our event study methodology borrows from the finance literature, in which it is often 
used to gauge the impact of announcements of mergers and acquisitions on stock prices. (For 
an excellent review of event studies, see MacKinlay, 1997.)  Instead of analyzing the impact of 
firm behavior on stock prices, our enumerators compiled a household history of fundamental 
1/0 events indicative of “development” that could be accurately pinned to a particular year in 
the life of the household. The RETRAFECT event-study methodology then examines how the 
probability of these events changes surrounding a treatment such as the introduction of a 
microfinance lender in a village or the take-up of microfinance itself.   
The data set we use in this analysis is unique in three respects.  First, we have a strong 
understanding about why certain villages received credit before others, where the microlender 
expanding operations introduced lending into villages off main highways first, and later into 
nearby villages off these main highways (and not, subject to this expansion decision rule, that 
the lender initially targeted better off or worse off villages.)  Second, like the Crépon et al. 
study, it is taken from a rural region in which microfinance did not exist before it was 
introduced by the lender in our study.  The third unique aspect of our data is that take-up of 
microfinance was extremely high in our study area when credit became available: 51% among 
our random sample of female entrepreneurs in the six villages from which we collect data, much 
higher than even the 12% take-up rate among the treated villages in the Crépon et al. study.  
The high take-up rate allows us greater latitude in measuring the impact of microfinance as it 
has been adopted widely within a given population, and yields considerable power in first-stage 
instrumental variable estimations. 
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We use the RETRAFECT event study methodology to estimate dynamic intention-to-
treat effects (ITT) controlling for observables while using a region-year fixed effect across 
paired villages, one of which received credit earlier and a neighboring village that received 
credit approximately two years later. Using a cross-sectional survey of 703 households in 
Nepal, enumerators carefully interviewed family members to create a household history over 
the previous ten years of discrete, fundamental events to the household that we would expect to 
be associated with growth in enterprises and increases in household welfare: major capital 
investments in enterprises, major home improvements, and purchases of consumer durables.  
The product of these 703 household histories is a retrospective panel data set that contains a 
matrix of over 7,000 dummy variables consisting of these relatively rare (average probability = 
0.037) fundamental events.   
We believe there are at least two important results from our study that add to this 
ongoing investigation into the worldwide impact of microfinance.  First, we find that 
subsequent to taking a microfinance loan, microfinance borrowers are significantly more likely 
to experience an increase in the probability of a broad array of investment and consumption 
variables.  In this respect, the anecdotal evidence cited by practitioners is corroborated by our 
data, and thus we find that practitioners are neither lying nor likely even exaggerating the 
positive changes to MFI borrowers that they witness after borrowers take microfinance loans.  
However, when we analyze changes in the probability of these events within a window 
surrounding the introduction of microfinance into our six villages, allowing us to estimate 
average treatment effects based on credit availability, we find the causal effect of microfinance to 
be far more modest than the apparent impact that a “before-and-after” analysis would suggest.  
Indeed we estimate that approximately 3/4 of the impact testified to by practitioners after 
taking microfinance appear to be something akin to an optical illusion, driven by correlated 
unobservables.  But we also find that the approximately one-fourth of this “apparent impact” 
that remains is non-trivial; our study finds impacts that are lower than those reported 
anecdotally by practitioners, but higher than those reported by most recent experimental and 
quasi-experimental studies. 
The second striking result from this data is the similarity of the microfinance impact 
results obtained using the event study methodology with the Crépon et. al (2013) experimental 
study, the best study of which we are aware that experimentally estimates microfinance impacts 
in a region previously unserved by microfinance.  Although carried out in different countries 
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(Morroco and Nepal) using different methodologies, the results of both indicate that 
microfinance has a strong impact on microenterprise expansion and on the size of livestock 
herds (depending on the type of enterprise), but no significant impact on consumption.  These 
results contrast to some degree with other work on microfinance published in this journal, 
including Imai et al. (2012) who find that countries with higher per capita microlending tend to 
have lower levels of poverty indices and Becchetti and Castriota’s (2011) work on microfinance 
in post disaster Sri Lanka, in which they find positive impacts on work hours and real income.  
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
empirical model that illustrates the potential for bias in both informally and formally 
ascertaining microfinance impact. Section 3 presents survey area, history of MFI, survey 
methodology and data. Section 4 discusses data analysis and results. Section 5 summarizes and 
reflects on our results. 
2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF MICROFINANCE BORROWING 
Consider an economy of n household enterprises, each with a parsimonious income function of 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡,      
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is net income of household i in period t, 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the existing capital stock, and 𝜙𝑖𝑡 is an 
unobservable complement to capital, such as economic opportunity, entrepreneurial ability, or 
self-motivation.3  For brevity’s sake we will call 𝜙𝑖𝑡 “economic opportunity.”  In our model 𝜙𝑖𝑡 
is a composite of two additive terms, 𝜙𝑖 , which is fixed for each i, and 𝜙𝑡 , which is stochastic 
and varies over time for each i.4  Thus 𝜙𝑖𝑡 =  𝜙𝑖 + 𝜙𝑡,  each term with respective variance 
𝜎𝑖
2 and 𝜎𝑡
2.  For simplicity of exposition, assume that the distributions of 𝜙𝑖 and 𝜙𝑡 across the 
population are such that all realizations of 𝜙𝑖𝑡  lie in the unit interval and are equally likely, i.e. 
𝜙𝑖𝑡~𝑈[0,1].  Higher realizations of 𝜙𝑖𝑡, however, are obviously more (less) likely among 
households with higher (lower) 𝜙𝑖 .  The price of output is equal to one so that output is equal 
to income, which may be spent on consumer goods or added to the next period’s capital stock.   
 Each household enterprise is endowed with  𝐾𝑖𝑡 units of capital, but may borrow to 
finance one more unit of capital. At the end of the period t, a borrowing household returns the 
one unit of borrowed capital, the principal, along with interest. The borrowing decision 
depends on the difference borrowing makes to net income; a household borrows if the rate of 
return on capital equals or exceeds the interest rate.  
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We assume that prior to the availability of microfinance, the credit market is serviced by 
moneylenders.  Moneylenders have inside information about 𝜙𝑖𝑡 and are fully exploitative first-
degree price discriminators, charging an interest rate 𝑟𝑙 = 𝜙𝑖𝑡 . The microfinance interest rate, 
however, is the same for all borrowers and across all time periods, lying between the extreme 
values of 𝜙𝑖𝑡, i.e., 𝑟 ∈ (0, 1). 
(𝑎) Apparent Impact of Microfinance 
 Microfinance practitioners and other observers of microfinance often make impact 
assessments based on welfare differences in households and their enterprises before and after 
taking microfinance loans.5  Impact is also at times validated by welfare differences between 
borrowers and non-borrowers.   But what we call the “apparent impact” of microfinance is 
influenced by the timing at which enterprises take microfinance loans.  Enterprises only take 
microfinance loans when opportunity dictates that it is profitable to do so.  The average 
enterprise income that is observed after taking a microfinance loan in period t is  
    𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑇 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝜙𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑟) = ( 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 1)𝜙𝑓 − 𝑟   (1) 
 where 𝜙𝑓 =
1
2
(1 + 𝑟), and 𝑇 = 1 and 𝑇 = 0 represent the states of treatment and non-
treatment (microfinance borrowing), respectively.  In other words, after taking a microfinance 
loan, income is equal to existing capital plus borrowed capital multiplied by opportunity less 
interest costs.  This contrasts with the income that is observed in microenterprises when they 
do not chose to take a microfinance loan, whose realization of “opportunity” is smaller: 




(𝑟).  The difference in outcomes between borrowing and non-borrowing 
households (or from before and after a given household enterprise i takes a loan), the 
“apparent impact” of microfinance, is equal to 
    𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑇 = 0) = 
1
2
[ 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 1 − 𝑟].   (3) 
 In the framework of the Rubin (1974) causal model, suppose we were to estimate the 
average treatment effect of microfinance on microfinance borrowers who would take a 
microfinance loan if it were available.  Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 and 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0 represent potential outcomes for a 
microenterprise in treated and untreated states, respectively, i.e., 
    𝑌𝑖𝑡





0 = 𝜙𝑖𝑡 𝐾𝑖𝑡.      (5) 
In (4) the outcome represents net income after borrowing, output less interest costs, while (5) is 
net income for the non-borrower. Every household enterprise, whether it in fact borrows or 
not, can realize either potential outcome.  But only one of the potential outcomes is observed 
since the treatment is either assigned or not for the same household enterprise, but not both: 
for borrowers, only 𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 is observed; for non-borrowers, only 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0 is observed. For each household 
enterprise i, the causal effect is 𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0.  For the treated group (i.e., borrowers), the average 
treatment effect is thus 
 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1− 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑇 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1− 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝜙𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑟) = 𝜙𝑓 − 𝑟 =
1
2
(1 − 𝑟),  (6) 
so that the effect on the treated is a function of the lower interest rate from the availability of 
microfinance. The upward bias in “apparent impact” based on differences between borrowing 
and non-borrowing households is the difference between (3) and (6), or  
1
2
𝐾𝑖𝑡 , which is 
increasing in the level of existing capital.  If we rewrite the apparent effect in (3) in Rubin's 
framework, we have  
  𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝑇 = 0) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑇 = 0).  (3') 
Comparing (3') and (6), we see the source of the bias: 
 
[𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑇 = 0)] − [𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
1|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑇 = 1)]
 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡
0|𝑇 = 0) =   𝐾𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑓 −  𝐾𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑙  =  
1
2
 𝐾𝑖𝑡.                                
 (7) 
As can be seen in (7), the bias results from trying to estimate the potential outcome of the 
treated group were they not treated by the average outcome of the non-treated group.  
However, the average potential outcome if the household is not treated ( 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0 ) would be different 
for the treated and non-treated groups (borrowers and non-borrowers), because the average 
opportunity of the treated is higher. Opportunity both affects outcomes and induces treatment, 
and hence leads to bias if it is used as the basis for comparison.  This is because households self-
select into the treated group if and only if their economic opportunities yield a return greater 
than the interest rate.  
(b) Potential Bias in Randomized Studies in Estimating Average Treatment Effects of Microfinance 
 Recent studies have sought to measure the impact of microfinance through field 
experiments.  Some of these studies have used experimental designs that have induced new 
borrowers to take microfinance in areas in which microfinance lending already exists.  This 
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means that when researchers estimate either the intention to treat (ITT) or the local average 
treatment effect (LATE), impacts are obtained on marginal “late-coming” borrowers 
(compliers) who take up microfinance loans often after credit has been previously available. 
While these studies may be able to identify the impact of credit expansion in a given area 
to new borrowers, they provide unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect of 
microfinance across the population only under a restricted set of conditions that would seem 
unlikely in most field contexts.  One potential context would be in which borrowers are credit 
constrained in the sense of Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), the assumption behind work such as Karlan 
& Zinmann (2011).  But note that for the LATE to estimate the ATT, even when satisfying the 
stable-unit-treatment-value assumption (SUTVA), the status of being credit constrained must 
be fully orthogonal to potential outcomes, which seems unlikely.  Another exception in which 
we would expect LATE estimates to closely approximate the ATT would be a case in which all 
borrowers induced to take loans through the encouragement of the experiment were 
information-constrained.  Yet a more likely case is the intermediate one, where there are 
information constraints on only a fraction of new compliers.  The degree of the bias would then 
depend on the relative fraction of new borrowers who were induced to take loans based on 
exposure to the information, and the fraction of those taking loans through realizing higher 
levels of economic opportunity than existed in previous periods.  For the latter, if it would have 
been profitable for the borrowers to take microfinance loans previously, they likely would have 
done so.   
Although the phenomenon has not been recognized routinely by previous work, it is 
straightforward to show that average treatment effects on later-takers of microfinance should 
be lower than impacts on early adopters. This holds true in the context of our model except in 
the special case in which the variance in the fixed individual component of opportunity, 𝜎𝑖
2, is 
zero across individuals and that all of the variation in economic opportunity resides in the 
idiosyncratic component of economic opportunity that varies over time, 𝜎𝑡
2.  In this special 
(extreme) case, marginal borrowers taking credit in later periods in an established market 
ought to realize long-term impacts from microfinance that are similar to existing borrowers 
since they are identical except for differences in the (later) timing of high realizations of the 
idiosyncratic component of opportunity, 𝜙𝑡 .  
However, as 𝜎𝑖
2 becomes larger relative to 𝜎𝑡
2, then the average productivity of 
borrowers taking microfinance loans for the first time becomes lower in every sequential period 
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in which microfinance is offered.  This is because (assuming t = 1 to be the period when credit 
is introduced)  𝐸[𝜙𝑖 | 𝜙1𝑡 ≤ 𝑟 ] <  𝐸[𝜙𝑖 | 𝜙1𝑡 > 𝑟 ],  which directly implies that 
 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡 | 𝜙1𝑡 ≤ 𝑟 ] < 𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡 | 𝜙1𝑡 > 𝑟 ]  for all t > 1.    (8) 
The intuition is that given  𝜎𝑖
2 > 0, borrowers with high 𝜙𝑖 are more likely to have a 
level of unobserved economic opportunity that exceeds the required threshold, 𝜙𝑖𝑡 > 𝑟, upon 
initial introduction of microfinance; by definition such borrowers are more likely to continue to 
exhibit high long-term impacts from borrowing.  In contrast, borrowers with low 𝜙𝑖 are more 
likely to have realizations of 𝜙𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑟 when microfinance is first introduced, take up credit only 
in latter periods when 𝜙𝑡 is high, and display lower impacts from it over time. (They are also 
more likely to drop out of the microfinance borrowing pool, since all borrowers only borrow in 
periods with sufficiently high 𝜙𝑡 that 𝜙𝑖𝑡 > 𝑟.)  Consequently, because borrowers with low 𝜙𝑖 
are less productive on average, microfinance will have a smaller expected impact on borrowers 
who take their first microfinance loans at later stages. 
 In summary, the discrepancy between the observations of microfinance practitioners 
and the estimated microfinance impact of recent experimental studies may result from two 
factors: (1) Practitioner observations of microfinance borrowers before-and-after borrowing 
and comparisons between borrowers and non-borrowers systematically overestimate the ATT;  
and (2) Researcher estimates of microfinance impacts from the uptake of microfinance in later 
periods after credit introduction are lower than the ATT across all borrowers.   
In contrast to most recent studies carried out in areas already served by microfinance 
lenders, we present microfinance impact estimations from an area previously unserved by 
microfinance.  Thus in these estimations carried out on virgin microfinance areas where credit 
availability is used as an instrument for take-up, our estimation of the LATE converges to an 
“instrumented ATT”  in the absence of “always takers” in the data (since clearly there can be no 
takers of microfinance when microfinance is not available).  We are able to find evidence of the 
both upward bias of “before-and-after” borrowing observations and the underestimation of 
microfinance treatment effects in studies carried out where microfinance has already existed. 
3.  SURVEY AREA, HISTORY OF MFI, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA  
(a) Microfinance Institution and Survey Area 
The data for this survey was collected in summer 2010 in the eastern Terai6 region 
(Morang and Jhapa districts) of Nepal, in the operating areas of the Jeevan Bikas Samaj7 
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(Livelihood Development Society), the first MFI to operate in the region.  Several years after it 
began operations in 2005, other MFIs began to start lending in the region. Established in 
September 1997 as a local club by a small group of local youths in village Amahi Bariyati, a 
remote village in the South-East region of the country, JBS carried out welfare and social 
activities for the local people living close around its club office.  Initially, JBS had no plan of 
engaging in microfinance extensively. But in 2003 the club met with the Rural Microfinance 
Development Centre Ltd. (RMDC), a second-tier microfinance organization, which encouraged 
the club to implement microfinance program in a wider scale.  After having some experience 
and intensive support of RMDC, JBS established its first branch office in 2005.  
JBS uses a group lending methodology similar to the classical Grameen group lending 
approach.8  Borrowing groups consist of five adult women of working age; five to ten groups 
form a center.  Groups are formed by eligible women themselves, not by the MFI.  Eligibility is 
determined using the following criteria: A borrower must be (a) female, (b) aged 18-60, 
(c) residing in the program area, (d) capable of income-generating activities, and (e) has a 
citizenship or other valid identification card. The center meetings are held every two weeks in 
the borrowers’ neighborhood, where a field staff conducts financial transactions, including 
collection of loan applications, loan repayments, and member savings.   
A loan to a borrower starts from (Nepal Rupees) NRs3,000 ($42) and gradually 
increases up to NRs60,000 ($833).  The loans have a one-year term, and the effective annual 
interest rate is approximately 25%.  The average size of a loan to a borrower in our sample is 
13,807(US$192), many loans being used for livestock investment, typically bullocks, or 
expansion of rural enterprises, often small village shops. In our sample, borrowers took two 
(one-year) loans on average.  Clients are not strictly required to start a business from the loans: 
the MFI recognizes that money is fungible and clients are left entirely free to choose the best 
use of money as long as loans are repaid.  Along with credit, the MFI offers compulsory and 
voluntary savings products, but JBS is principally a lending organization, and not directly 
involved in activities such as business training or financial literacy promotion.  
After its initial lending began in 2005, JBS began to expand its microfinance lending 
operations into new villages that had never before had access to microfinance.  The manner in 
which JBS introduces its microfinance program into new villages is methodical, transparent, 
and important to our impact-identification strategy.   
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According to directors, new expansion of JBS lending into villages was not based on 
local economic conditions, which were viewed to be more-or-less uniform, but rather by a 
methodical geographical expansion into rural eastern Nepal.  JBS begins its operations in an 
area by opening a major branch office in a new region, first implementing its program in the 
area located just around its branch office, and then after one or more years of operation, 
expands over time to provide credit to one or more nearby villages in that region.  The first 
branch office typically is located in a larger village or town that is on a main road.  Later, 
lending is introduced into villages that are located on smaller roads that lie off the initial main 
road, or farther away on the main road from urban centers until regional coverage is achieved.  
Although this was the pattern of the JBS rollout, due to uncertainties with regards to funding 
and other logistical matters, it was certainly not clear to potential borrowers in the secondary 
villages that JBS microfinance would ever reach their own location. Due to these uncertainties, 
at the time there was never any solid basis for the belief that credit was eminently arriving into 
the secondary villages, and anticipation which could have potentially affected borrower 
behavior. 
The six villages in our study were chosen in the following way.  We chose three branch 
areas in which microfinance was introduced into a population for the first time in sequential 
years, 2005, 2006, and 2007.  Microfinance started in a single village in each of these years, but 
then as JBS extended its credit coverage within each region, other villages near the first village 
were ultimately included in the program. For each of these three village development 
committees (VDCs)9 that received microfinance program in 2005-2007, we chose a second 
paired village--located within of 5-10 KM of the initial village—that received access to the 
microfinance program one to two years after the first village in the region gained access to 
microfinance.  We limited our study to these six paired villages because they represented the 
cleanest example in which microfinance was introduced sequentially, and for the very first time. 
The villages include, from Karsiya branch, Dadarbairiya (2005)10 and Thalaha (2007); 
from Itabhatta branch, Jyamirgadhi (2006) and Bahundangi (2008); and from Amardaha branch; 
Amardaha (2007) and Govindpur (2008) (see map in Figure 1). Thus, villages are intentionally 
grouped into three pairs, one village a first recipient of JBS credit in the early years of 
operation from 2005 to 2007, and then a second neighboring village that was provided access to 
JBS credit one to two years later when funding allowed for expansion into the neighboring 
village.  In Figure 1, the villages with the dark circles indicate where credit was introduced first 
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village among the pair (Dadarbairiya, Jyamirgadhi, and Amardaha); the villages with lighter 
circles indicate the second villages in the pair (Thalaha,  Bahundangi, and  Govindpur), that 
gained access to microfinance credit in a subsequent year.   
Within these villages, we randomly selected seventy to ninety households in each of the 
six villages for the survey who met the aforementioned eligibility criteria for JBS.  Because 
microfinance had not been previously available and because there was a great demand for it, 
take-up among the randomly sampled population had been extremely high; 244 of our 478 
randomly selected households that met the lending criteria from the villages had taken credit 
with JBS.  In addition, we intentionally included another random sample of 225 households that 
had been members of JBS, thus we oversampled borrowers, reweighting our estimations 
subsequently.  
(b)  Empirical Methods 
We use two approaches to estimating microfinance impacts from the JBS program.  
First we present results from an event-study methodology, Retrospective Analysis of 
Fundamental Events Contiguous to Treatment (RETRAFECT).  We derive in the Appendix 
the technical conditions under which RETRAFECT estimates can have a causal interpretation.  
In brief, causal interpretation of parameters relies on the assumption given in (A7) that 
?̈?𝑖𝑡 ⊥ 𝑇𝑖
𝑡−𝑘,𝑡+𝑘|?̃?𝑖𝑡, where ?̈?𝑖𝑡 is a vector of unobservable covariates that must be orthogonal to 
treatment 𝑇𝑖 during the event window t – k to t + k given a vector ?̃?𝑖𝑡 of observed covariates, 
that includes observed causes and proxies.  This assumption is a dynamic form of the basic 
unconfoundedness assumption originally developed by Rubin (1974, 1977). 
In this methodology, enumerators work with subjects to carefully create a household 
history of fundamental events that have a theoretical basis for responding to development 
interventions such as microfinance.  Following McIntosh et al. (2011), these events must be 
(a) discrete, measured only in terms of ones (event occurred) and zeros (absence of the event); 
(b) memorable and able to be pinpointed to a particular year; (c) reflect welfare changes of a 
household; and (d) potentially responsive to the intervention.  All survey questions were 
designed to be compatible with these criteria.   
Secondly, we use this data on fundamental events in difference-in-difference estimations 
for which we organize our data into the three regions, each with one village receiving credit 
one to two years earlier than its partner village.  We first check to verify that rates of 
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investment, home improvement, and durable goods consumption were not statistically different 
between these pair villages, and then test for pre-treatment parallel trends between villages 
that received credit first and those who received it later.  Using simple t-tests and difference-in-
differences regression, we then compare (a) differences between the two villages during the 
years before the first village in each region gained access to microfinance, with (b) differences 
between the two villages during the years when the first village enjoyed microfinance access 
while the second village did not.      
The fundamental events we used in this study recorded major capital investments in a 
household enterprise (purchase of livestock, new agricultural land, major machinery, a new 
store or kiosk), discrete changes in home improvements (building a new roof on a house, new 
walls, a major floor upgrade, a new indoor toilet), and the first purchase of major household 
consumer durables (television, bicycle, cell phone, stove).   
A history of these 1/0 events for each household are recorded in a matrix of a backcast 
panel data over the previous ten years, from year 2001 through 2010.  The psychology 
literature has shown that in collecting this type of survey data it is often helpful to place events 
in a time context with other events (Conway & Bekerian, 1987).  Indeed in recent work in 
among Indian fisherman, Giné & de Francesca (2011) show that the use of these benchmarks is 
important for accuracy in collecting recall data.  In our study when it was difficult for 
respondents to determine the year of an event, enumerators used ages of children, births and 
deaths of family members, years of important cricket matches, and other key benchmarks in the 
household history to pinpoint the year in which the event took place.  Changes in the 
probabilities of these events are estimated around the timing of the treatment (program access 
or credit take-up).  
In our sample population, 58% household heads are illiterate, 33% have primary 
education and 8% have high school education.  Average age of the household heads is 39.9 
years, number of members in a family is 4.9, and average land holding per family is 0.61 acres. 
Agricultural production is main occupation of 26% families, (agricultural) retail trade11 of 54% 
families and both agriculture production and retail trade of 20% families. Two-thirds (67%) of 
the households in our sample were borrowers of JBS.  The dropout rate was very low (2%) from 
the program in our survey sample. Descriptive statistics and pre-credit baselines of the 
dependent and control variables are shown in Table 1.  In the final two columns we give means 
of dependent variables in the two years before the rollout occurred in first village of the three 
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village pairs.  We see that consumption of televisions and bicycles were somewhat higher in the 
first villages to receive the microfinance program and land purchases were higher in the second 
villages to receive the treatment within the pairs.  But all other variables regarding business 
investment, housing improvements, and consumer durables were not insignificantly different 
between the village pairs before program rollout. 
(c) Empirical Estimations 
In our event-study estimations we use a linear probability model (LPM) instead of 
probit or logit models, since as a linear estimator it produces more robust estimates when flat 
panel datasets are used with fixed-effect estimations (Chamberlin, 1979). Moreover, with low-
frequency events such as those in our survey (where the average probability of one of these 
fundamental events is only 0.037), the LPM fares well because there is little risk of projecting 
probabilities outside of the [0, 1] probability space when expected effects are positive.  Our 
RETRAFECT model estimates  
  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽
𝐶 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝐶?̅?+𝑘
𝑡=?̅?−𝑘 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐶
    (9) 
  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽
𝑇 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝑇?̅?+𝑘
𝑡=?̅?−𝑘 𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑇
    (9´) 
where yijt is binary economic impact variable that is equal to 1 if a given event occurs for 
household i living in region j at time t (e.g. an upgrade to a dwelling).  Right-hand-side 
variables include a region-year fixed effect, 𝛼𝑗𝑡 , a vector of control variables, 𝑋′, and the event 
study treatment window with coefficients 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡 and lead/lag indicator dummies 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
which represent credit take-up and credit availability, respectively.  Thus, the coefficient 𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝐶  , 
for example, gives the difference in outcome 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 between the treatment villages when they had 
access to microfinance for one year relative to the partner villages in that same year.  We set 
k = 4, and thus estimate a symmetric 9-year credit-treatment-window containing four leads and 
lags variables around treatment. 
An advantage of the RETRAFECT event-study estimations is that they are able to 
illustrate the dynamics of impact over a number of years.  However, our data also allow for 
difference-in-difference estimations which are more appropriate for estimating standard impact 
statistics.  But first, to obtain an estimate of what practitioners observe, we look at the 
differences in outcomes between borrowing and non-borrowing examining changes on 
fundamental events that occur when a household takes a microfinance loan, corresponding to 
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equation (3) in our theoretical framework.  For the “apparent effect” observed from credit take-
up we estimate 
   𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜋𝑌𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡    (10) 
where 𝛼𝑗  is a regional fixed effect, 𝑿𝒊
′ is a vector of controls that includes gender, age, age-
squared, education, and type of enterprise, 𝑌𝑡 is a year time trend, 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable 
turning to 1 when household i receives credit through a microfinance loan at time t, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is 
an error term. The coefficient 𝛿 represents the observed difference in the dependent variable 
between a household taking and a household not taking a microfinance loan, adjusted for these 
controls.  Note that by utilizing a regional fixed effect, this difference incorporates differences 
between households with and without credit as well as differences over time in one household 
between periods when it has a loan and when it does not. 
 To compare what practitioners observe to what is more likely to reflect actual 
microfinance impact, we estimate Intention to Treat (ITT) effects using difference-in-
differences that yield microfinance effects across the entire population of our sample.  These 
estimations show the impact of the program, not just on borrowers, but on our entire sample, 
which involves those eligible for the JBS program.   
We divide our data into three periods: period 1, period 2, and period 3.  The first village 
in the regional pair to receive credit is referred to as Village A, the second Village B.  In a given 
region, Period 1 is defined as the period beginning in 2001 in which neither of the two villages 
had access to microfinance and ending the year before Village A gained access to the JBS 
microfinance program.  Period 2 begins in the first year, by region, when the A-Villages gained 
credit access and ends in the year before the B-Villages also gained credit access.  Period 3 
begins in the first year in which the B-Villages received the JBS program and ends in 2010, so 
that in the third period both villages had access to microfinance. 
Thus we estimate the equation 
   𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝑷𝒕
′𝜽𝒕 + 𝛿𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 ,    (11) 
(where i now represents a period as opposed to a year) and 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the average annual 
probability of a fundamental event in a given period. In (11), 𝛼𝑗 is a region fixed-effect, 𝑿𝒊
′ is our 
vector of controls, 𝑷𝒕
′
 is the vector of (two) period dummies (where period 1 is omitted as the 
baseline) and 𝑇𝑖 is equal to one if household i is a member of a village with microfinance access 
in the second or third period.   
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We also estimate a LATE (instrumented ATT) using two-stage least squares with first-
stage  
   𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗
1 + 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝟏 + 𝑷𝒕
𝟏′𝜽𝒕 + 𝜑𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (12) 
and second stage 
   𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗
2 + 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷𝟐 + 𝑷𝒕
𝟐′𝜽𝒕 + 𝜏?̂?𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖    (12´) 
by instrumenting for credit take-up 𝐶𝑖𝑡 with credit availability 𝑇𝑖𝑡.12  Estimation of the local 
average treatment effect yields an estimate of microfinance impact on “compliers,” those who 
were induced by the existence of the program to undertake microfinance who would not have 
done so otherwise, and 𝜏  gives an estimate of the instrumented ATT.  Since at this time 
microfinance was not available through any microfinance provider other than JBS, we would 
expect the instrumented ATT to provide reasonable estimates for the impact of the program 
more generally on microfinance borrowers. 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
(a) Event Study Results 
The RETRAFECT methodology is useful exploring the dynamics of changes in impact 
variables over a number of years surrounding treatment.  Under strong assumptions regarding 
the orthogonality of program placement with respect to impact variables, it is able to yield 
estimates of program impact.  We formally lay out these assumptions in the Appendix.  
Equations (9) and (9’) illustrate the dynamics of apparent impact and causal impact on 
fundamental household events.  Results of these estimations are given in Tables 2A, 2B, and 
2C.  The five columns to the left show breakdowns for individual events associated with 
development for credit availability with the fifth column showing cumulative impacts on all 
four of the events for each of the three table categories (enterprise investment, housing 
improvements, and consumer goods).  The sixth column on the right shows the cumulative 
impacts for credit take-up.  Figures 1A – 3B show the dynamics of apparent impact (credit take-
up) and causal impact (credit availability) in graphical form. We cluster standard errors of our 
estimated coefficients at the household level. 
 Table 2A shows the RETRAFECT estimations of the impact of credit availability on 
enterprise investment.  Credit availability appears to display no significant impact on 
investments in machinery or on land purchases, but does significantly impact investment in 
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livestock and new stores (new physical retail space).  The livestock impact makes sense given 
that many of the loans were granted to rural households for herd expansion and to retailers 
also seeking to expand.  These impacts are large in magnitude, beginning mainly two years 
after initial borrowing, and ranging from a 2.4 to 7.8 percentage point increase in the 
probability of a major investment in either of these two categories over a baseline of less than 
half a percentage point. The summary category for any enterprise investment is also large, 
increasing the probability of any major enterprise investment in the second, third, and fourth 
years after initial credit by 8.0, 7.1, and 8.5 percentage points, respectively.   
 These magnitudes are smaller than the increases in the probability of enterprise 
investment after credit take-up, which begin in the year the first microfinance loan is received 
and continue to the fourth year after credit, ranging from 9.2 to 13.8 percentage points.  Given 
that JBS take-up was 51% in our sample, the apparent and causal impacts for enterprise 
investment are fairly similar, with the apparent impact simply occurring earlier in time than the 
causal impact.  For both types of estimations, Table 2A gives F-statistics testing differences 
between estimated probabilities of enterprise investment before and after credit access/take-up 
that are highly significant.  All estimations use region-year fixed effects and controls for age, 
age-squared and type of enterprise.  The estimations on credit access are weighted so that 
borrowers in the data accurately represent their proportion in the random sample.  Differences 
between the two RETRAFECT estimations can be seen visually in Figures 1A and 1B, where 
the dotted line represents a 95% confidence interval around each dynamic point estimate. 
 RETRAFECT estimations for housing improvements are given in Table 2B.  In the 
credit access estimations, only one housing improvement variable is significant in one year: new 
walls in the first year after credit.  Given that there are 16 such impact coefficients, the outcome 
probably reflects expected random variation in the estimated parameters.  None of the other 
measures of home improvements show any level of significance in any year subsequent to the 
first year of credit access.   
 With the home improvement variables, we see the first real divergence between the 
apparent impact of microfinance and causal impact.  The estimations around credit take-up 
show large increases in the probability of a home improvement subsequent to taking a 
microfinance loan, ranging from a 4.8 percentage point increase in the year the first 
microfinance loan was taken to 11.7 in the third year after taking a loan.  The result is nearly 
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identical with McIntosh et al.’s (2011) finding of large increases in home improvements 
subsequent to the taking of microfinance loans in Ghana, Guatemala, and India.    
 Apparent impact of microfinance on consumer durables overstates causal impact only 
slightly less than on home improvements.  Whereas estimates of increases in the probability of 
a major consumer good range from 9.2 to 10.3 percentage points after the year of credit take-
up, the RETRAFECT window around credit access shows only modest evidence of increases in 
the probability of bicycles, cell phones, and stoves around the second year after credit access.  
While the F-statistic testing for “before-and-after” differences in major consumer good 
purchases around credit take-up is significant at the 2% level, it is insignificant for credit access.   
(b) Difference-in-difference Results 
We show simple difference-in-difference outcomes for business investment, home 
improvements and consumer durables for periods 1 and 2 in Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C, 
respectively.  In period 1 neither A-Villages nor B-Villages in each of the three regions had 
access to credit.  In period 2, A-Villages had credit access, but not B-Villages.  Results of t-tests 
of these raw difference-in-differences are given in the figures.   
Figure 4A shows that while difference-in-differences seem to result in substantially 
larger increases in business investment (2.75 percentage points, baseline in Table 1= 2.70%) for 
the A-Villages with microfinance access, the difference is only marginally statistically 
significant (p-value 0.105).  Similarly, the A-Villages with microfinance access also display 
higher rates of increase in home improvement over this period (2.36 percentage points, baseline 
in Table 1 = 3.00%), but the increase is statistically insignificant (p-value 0.128).  In contrast, 
consumer durable purchases are significantly lower in A-Villages, increasing much faster among 
the three villages with delayed microfinance access (p-value 0.002) as shown in Figure 4C. 
Table 3 presents three types of estimations:  
(1) Take-up estimations, which show the differences in outcome variables that occur with 
microfinance borrowing and estimate equation (10).  These isolate differences in impact 
variables associated with a household having a microfinance loan.   
(2) Intention-to-treat (ITT) effects, that estimate equation (11) and show the impact of 
microfinance availability on all households in a village, who were all eligible for the JBS 
program, weighted to account for our over-sampling of borrowers.   
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(3) Estimates of the instrumented ATT in (12’), which show the impact of the program on 
“compliers” who took the program at any point during the respective period it was offered.  
These offer interesting comparisons to the “apparent impacts” given in the take-up estimations.   
The instrumented ATT estimates use microfinance access as an instrument for take-up.  
Because of the nature of JBS program rollout, where programs were introduced by village 
based on a transparent geographical expansion strategy rather than by village economic 
factors, the instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction provided that this geographical 
expansion strategy is independent of differences in economic outcomes and trends between A-
Villages and B-Villages.  Note that in the presence of externalities to microfinance investment, 
the SUTVA assumption would not hold and any positive spillovers from microfinance 
borrowing are imputed from non-borrowers to the treated such that while these impacts exist, 
the treatment effect actually accruing to the borrower would be lower.  However, we feel 
reasonably comfortable that microfinance externalities are small if they exist at all.  The largest 
controlled study carried out in a virgin microfinance area, Crépon et al. (2013), for example, 
tests for and finds no empirical evidence for microfinance externalities. 
We test for similarity in pre-treatment outcomes between villages as well as pre-
treatment parallel trends in our three major categories of impact variables: business 
investment, home improvements, and consumer durable purchases. We find no significant 
differences between A-Villages and B-Villages in pre-treatment (2001-2004) outcomes among 
the three aggregated impact variables (t-statistics = 0.84, 0.23, -1.02, respectively).  We also 
test for pre-treatment parallel trends, differences in trends between A- and B-Villages between 
2001-02 and 2003-04.  Two of these three tests (business investment and consumer durables) 
yield no significant results (t-statistics = 0.75, -1.61, respectively), but the test on home 
improvements shows a significantly higher trend in the B-Villages during this time (t = 2.64), a 
result is driven by an abnormal spike in home improvement in 2003 in Bahundangi of 0.171, 
which reverted back to 0.014 in 2004.  If this, however, constitutes part of a true underlying 
trend, it would tend to bias our results for home improvement against rejecting a null 
hypothesis in favor of positive impact from microcredit, since the pretreatment “trend” would 
be greater in the B-Villages.    
The estimations in Table 3 show that practitioner observations considerably overstate 
the true impacts of microfinance, but that microfinance still appears to have significant impacts.  
These are limited mainly to business investment, but the impact on the probability of a new 
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business investment in our Nepal study is substantial. Although the apparent impact on 
business investment--differences in the probability of a major capital investment between when 
a borrower does and does not have a microfinance loan--is nearly 40% larger than what is 
measured by the instrumented ATT for business investment, the causal effects estimated by the 
ITT and the instrumented ATT are large, with percentage point increases of 2.5 and 10.8, 
respectively over a baseline probability of a 2.7 percent chance of any type of major investment 
in a given year.   These are larger effects than have been reported in most recent experimental 
and quasi-experimental studies, but not necessarily larger than what we might expect in a 
region in which microfinance has been newly introduced and where take-up is widespread.   
Similarly, the apparent affect is over 50% larger for home improvements than the 
instrumented ATT estimates.  For consumer durables, the apparent effect is enormous (12.7 
percentage points) while the instrumented ATT estimate is strongly negative (-20.4 percentage 
points).  Over our 12 non-aggregated impact variables, apparent impact is significant for 11 of 
these variables, while the local average treatment effect is significant for only two: new store 
capital and new livestock, and only at the 5% and 10% levels respectively, although the 
coefficients indicate a large 9.4 percentage point increase in the probability of new livestock 
investments and a 3.3 percentage point increase in the probability of new store capital.   
We cluster standard errors at the household level in these estimations.  This seems to 
be the most reasonable approach to us given the nature of our data, where the strongest 
correlation the residuals is most likely to be within a given household over time.  As a 
robustness check, however, we also cluster standard errors at the village level (Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan, 2008), but clustering is problematic due to the small number of villages (six).  
The solution to this problem is to implement the Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) wild 
bootstrap which allows for clustering with small for a smaller number of clustering units (<40).  
The wild bootstrap resamples using a multiplicative correction to residuals in the context of 
cluster-level heteroskedasticity to allow for unbiased estimates of standard errors.  As seen in 
Table 3, after carrying out the wild bootstrap and clustering at the village level, significance for 
business investment on microfinance take-up remains under the wild bootstrap estimation and 
significance is retained for capital investment in store investment, however it falls to 
insignificance for investment in new livestock.  Thus, using this alternative method of 
clustering, the evidence falls slightly more toward the lower levels of impact noted by 
researchers and away from that claimed by practitioners.  
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Under either type of clustering procedure, we find positive microfinance impact results 
that appear to exceed those estimated by the slew of recent randomized evaluations carried out 
in places with high levels of existing microfinance lending (Karlan and Zinman, 2011; 
Angelucci et al., 2012; Attanasio et al., 2011; Augsburg et al., 2012; Banerjee et al., 2013.)  But 
there are strong parallels between our findings and those of Crépon et al. (2013) in Morocco, 
where microfinance was absent prior to the studied credit intervention.  Like many of these 
experimental papers, we find positive impacts of microfinance borrowing on business expansion 
but small or negative impacts on consumer spending.  Our instrumented ATT impact estimates 
indicate a point estimate of 10.8 percentage point increase in the probability of some kind of 
business investment.  This comes from significant increases in livestock (when standard errors 
are clustered at the household level) and physical investment in store buildings, but not 
significantly from investments in land and machines, although both of these have positive point 
estimates.   
Like many of the recent studies on microfinance based on randomized evaluations, we 
also find a reduction in consumer-oriented goods, which similarly appear to be sacrificed in 
favor of business expansion, but this cannot be verified with certainty.  Nearly all of these 
recent studies cited above find reductions in “temptation goods” after microfinance borrowing 
(goods which households indicate they would like to spend less on such as alcohol and tobacco), 
and similarly we find a negative impact on television purchases in our data—the probability of 
purchasing a television falls dramatically by 14.5 percentage points—which parallels a 
movement toward enterprise investment.  Thus our findings are similarly consistent with the 
idea that microfinance fosters a movement away from “temptation” goods and toward 
“efficiency” goods.  Our difference-in-difference findings diverge slightly from the Crépon et al. 
(2013) study in that we also find some very modest evidence for a positive impact on home 
improvements in that while none of our impact variables (improvements in roof, wall, floor, and 
toilet) are statistically significant, all except improved floor carry positive coefficients. 
(c) Other Robustness Checks 
 Our methodology uses recall data to construct a backcast panel data set of fundamental 
events to the household. Clearly it is of interest to know how robust these results are to the 
accuracy of the timing of these events.  While there is little doubt that many of the events in 
question took place (home improvements, purchase of certain consumer durables, business 
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investment since their existence in the present can be quickly verified; the main question of 
interest is how robust the results are to inaccuracy in the timing of the events.  
To carry out robustness checks for recall accuracy, we generate random (0,1) normal 
distribution z-scores for every observation in the data set to represent departures from perfect 
recall of the timing of the fundamental event.  We assume that recall over the particular year a 
fundamental event took place is distributed normally with variance 2.  We then create a recall 
parameter, , which is equal to standard deviations per year away from the true year of the 
event in the recall distribution.  A smaller  would thus represent less accurate memory in 
pinpointing the year a given event took place; larger  would represent more accurate recall.  
For example, with  = 1, a simulated random z-score for an observation where z  [-1, 1] 
means that the year of the event was recalled with accuracy, z  [-2, -1) means that the event 
was recalled one year earlier than the event actually occurred, z  [-3, -2) means that the event 
was recalled two years earlier than it actually occurred.  With z  (1, 2] the event was recalled 
one year after it actually occurred, and so forth.  A lower value of  indicates poorer quality 
recall so that, for example, with  = 0.50, a simulated random z-score for an observation where 
z  (1.5, 2] would mean that the year of the event was recalled as occurring three years after it 
actually occurred. 
  We focus on our most significant positive result, the impact of microfinance on 
business investment in our sample, considering first our event-study estimations.  Consider the 
nine-year window results in Table 2A, where the F-statistic on the significance of post- to pre-
microfinance years is 7.96, with p-value =0.0048.   At recall error  = 1, the F-statistic falls to 
6.52, but impact on business investment is still strongly significant (p = 0.0124).  At our 
previous example of  = 0.50, the F-statistic falls to 0.67 (p = 0.4131) and significance 
disappears entirely.  The borderline cases when the quality of recall is just large enough to 
yield significance are at  = 0.75, which yields an F-statistic of 2.74 (p = 0.097), making the 
impact on business investment marginally significant at the 10% level, and  = 0.82, which 
yields an F-statistic of 3.86 (p = 0.049), where the impact is marginally significant at the 5% 
level.13  Thus in our borderline 5-percent-significance case, 58.8% of our subjects would recall 
the event year with accuracy, 15.5 percent each would mistakenly recall the event one year too 
closely to the present and one year too far into the past, and 4.5 percent each would recall the 
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event two years too closely to the present and two years too far into the past, and about 0.7 
percent each would recall the event three years too closely to the present and three years too 
far into the past.14 Because p-values are relatively low for our difference-in-difference 
estimations, the robustness of our significant results for our ITT and instrumented ATT for 
business investment are more sensitive, reaching a 10% significance level at  = 1.96 and 1.94, 
meaning that the statistical significance of the results are sensitive to more than about 5% of 
the subjects failing to recall the correct year in which business investment took place.   
Because we have multiple hypotheses, a further robustness check controls the 
familywise error rate over the family of hypotheses in our paper.  Using the Holm-Bonferroni 
step-down procedure (see Holm, 1979) at  =0.10 across out three summary indices, where we 
establish a ranking of m p-values indexed by p(k) in decreasing order of magnitude: 




, where k*  corresponds to the marginal p-value (hypothesis) that satisfies 
this criterion.  For our RETRAFECT estimations, seven out of our ten significant post-credit 
take-up coefficients retain significance for our summary indices on investment, dwelling 
improvements, and consumer goods, while we are no longer able to reject three of our null 
hypotheses, and we are unable to reject the null in any of our ITT estimations, although 
business investment is close to marginally significant.  For difference-in-difference estimations, 
we find that each of our take-up estimations is robust to controlling the familywise error rate, 
but that because our statistical significance for new investments is only marginally significant 
at the 10% level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no impact after we control the 
familywise error rate.  Thus, in general we find that our robustness checks push our 
RETRAFECT results closer to the weaker microfinance impacts found in recent well-known 
experimental studies. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Our paper explores the impact of institutional microcredit on the improvement of 
household welfare of the poor in rural Nepal, while attempting to explain the paradox between 
the high levels of microfinance impact reported anecdotally by practitioners and the low levels 
of impact reported by recent experimental studies.   
An empirical shortcoming of our study is the relatively small number of villages (six) 
where credit was newly introduced to sequential pairs of highly similar villages never having 
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previous access to microfinance.  Although implementation of the wild bootstrap yields an 
unbiased estimation of standard errors in the presence of a small number of clusters, it still 
means that statistical power in our study--to reject false null hypotheses of no microfinance 
impact--is lower than ideal.  Nevertheless the data from these six villages are unique for three 
reasons:  First, we have reason to believe that credit was allocated to new villages in a manner 
orthogonal to changes in welfare variables over time.  Second, the credit introduced by JBS was 
the first microcredit available to the population in our study area.  Third, credit take-up was 
extremely high among eligible households after it was introduced, far higher than the 
differential rates induced by recent experimental designs.  So while the data from our study 
comes from a small number of villages, the unique data from these villages helps us to avoid 
some of the pitfalls that plague many recent studies that have sought to analyze the impact of 
microfinance, but in areas in which microfinance had already been introduced.   
We demonstrate in a simple model why the before-and-after observations of 
practitioners overstate the average treatment effect of microfinance, and why the results from 
recent studies of microfinance—those carried out where microfinance pre-existed experimental 
interventions--underestimate average treatment effects.   
While our empirical results appear to reveal greater microfinance impacts than most 
recent randomized evaluations, they display far smaller and more limited impacts than are often 
claimed in the microfinance industry.  Many of these impacts claimed in the microfinance 
industry are derived from the difference in the lives of borrowers after taking microfinance 
loans.  There are many ways one could measure this overstatement of impact.  Our results 
indicate that of the 13 post-credit coefficients that are significant in our RETRAFECT 
estimations for apparent impact (credit take-up), only 4 are significant in our causal impact 
estimations related to credit availability.  In our difference-in-difference estimations, out of 14 
coefficients significant for apparent impact, only 3 are significant in instrumented ATT 
estimates, and only one (impact on investment in rural enterprise capital) under the wild 
bootstrap robustness check.  Thus about 75% these coefficients indicating apparent impact do 
not show actual impact.   
Moreover, if we look at all 12 of our individual dependent (impact) variables in terms of 
their point-estimated magnitudes of impact in Table 3, the median overstatement of apparent 
impact is also close to 75% (where impact on new walls is overstated by 75%, and on new cell 
phones by 73%.)  Thus based on a consensus of all of these criteria in our Nepal data, we 
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conclude that approximately 3/4 of apparent microfinance impact to be an illusion driven by 
correlated unobservables. 
Nevertheless, of the true causal impact that remains, we do find evidence of positive and 
significant effects from microfinance provision in Nepal:  The substantial increase in enterprise 
expansion we observe in our data is an encouraging impact result from a microcredit program 
which provides loans that are quite small (only US$192 on average) in these rural areas of 
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1 Microcredit Summit, 2014.  Data reported are as of December 31, 2012. 
2 Field et al. (2013) find statistically significant impacts on profits in a treatment group in which microfinance 
borrowers were given a grace period before their initial interest payment at the expense of higher default rates. 
3
 To avoid notational clutter, we will generally suppress the i  subscript notation as all of our arguments apply 
equally to comparing a single household across time as to comparing across households at a single period in time.   
4 Clearly there loans can be triggered by events that are unrelated to a positive shock in productivity of an 
enterprise, however an important feature of our model demonstrates that it is rational for borrowers to take loans 
when these positive opportunity shocks do occur, and that this may lead to overstatement of program impact.   
5 The websites of leading microfinance institutions contain many stories intended to illustrate the impact of 
microfinance loans.  For example, a story that appears on the website of Opportunity International relates that 
“Rayusa Muzalila of Kiganda, Uganda, has used Opportunity loans to expand her grocery and start a textile 
business. With her increased profits, she has opened her first-ever savings account…”  A similar story on the 
ACCION website reads that “(After a series of microloans) Juan now has a full workshop of tools, including a 
modern table saw. Employing several neighborhood boys part-time, he can now turn out one couch a day…”  
6 Terai is southern plain area of Nepal where climate is sub-tropical and population density is high as compared to 
Northern hilly region of Nepal. 
7 The MFI’s portfolio status as of mid-July 2010 included outstanding loans of NRs. 553 million (US$7.7 million 
approx.), 46,914 total borrowers , 60,623 individuals with outstanding savings of NRs. 227.5 million (US$3.16 
million), a loan recovery rate of just under 100%, operational self-sufficiency ratio of 155%, and a financial self-
sufficiency ratio  of 125%. 
8 A main feature of Grameen Classical System is group liability in repayment of individual loans. Grameen Bank, 
Bangladesh has moved to Grameen Generalized System in 1992 from its Grameen Classical System. 
9 A village development committee (VDC) is a political area consists of many small clusters (villages).  
10 The year in parenthesis indicates the year when microfinance program was rolled-out in the respective VDC. 
11 Retail trade includes petty trading of vegetables, groceries, grains, livestock. 
12 IV-first stage results for credit availability as an instrument for credit take-up show an F-statistic equal to 
95.3 in the first-stage, indicating credit-availability (not surprisingly) to be strong instrument for credit take-up. 
13
 Five-year window results are robust at the 5-percent level to  = 1.70.   
14
 In Giné and Francesca’s (2012) data on 32 observations of boat purchases, they find that coefficient of variation 
for boat purchase recall data (s.d. =16.7 months / mean = 63.3 months) that is only 23% higher than that for 
administrative data, but that subjects appear to negatively telescope purchases about six months too far into the 
past.  If a similar sized negative telescoping phenomenon were to be present in our data, it would leave impact 
results unaffected because the significant effects we estimate on business investment (see Table 2A) occur two 
years after the implementation of the microfinance program. 
 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 Sample Statistics 
Baseline 
Statistics 
Two Years Before Rollout in 
first village of village pair 
  Mean Std. Dv. Mean Std. Dv. Mean Mean t-test 




 Village  
Roof 0.032 0.176 0.020 0.139 0.020 0.0165 0.467 
Wall 0.005 0.068 0.002 0.050 0.002 0.000 0.926 
Floor 0.007 0.084 0.004 0.062 0.003 0.007 1.071 
Toilet 0.014 0.118 0.008 0.088 0.007 0.142 1.275 
     Home improvement 0.048 0.214 0.030 0.169 0.027 0.035 0.817 
Television 0.041 0.199 0.027 0.162 0.031 0.009 2.433 
Bicycle 0.062 0.241 0.036 0.187 0.049 0.018 2.692 
Cell phone 0.052 0.222 0.009 0.092 0.007 0.004 0.511 
Stove 0.007 0.081 0.003 0.056 0.006 0.002 0.910 
     Consumer durables 0.133 0.339 0.067 0.250 0.083 0.0332 3.423 
Livestock 0.049 0.215 0.016 0.126 0.020 0.014 0.778 
Machine 0.007 0.085 0.003 0.053 0.004 0.0023 0.489 
Store 0.007 0.085 0.003 0.056  0.005 0.000 1.467 
Net-land purchase 0.015 0.120 0.005 0.070 0.000 0.007 2.652 
     Business Investment 0.073 0.261 0.027 0.161 0.029 0.023 0.604 
Control variables        
Age 39.920 12.239      
Education*  1.498 0.644      
Agriculture 0.259 0.438      
Retail trade 0.543 0.498      
Agriculture and retail 0.198 0.398      




Table 2A : OLS RETRAFECT Regression on Business Investment 
 
      --- Credit Availability Window --- 
Uptake 
Window 
 New New New New Any new Any new 
VARIABLES Machine land livestock Store investment investment 
            
 4 years before -0.001 0.004 -0.020* 0.002 -0.017 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.003) (0.014) (0.008) 
3 years before -0.001 0.002 -0.012 0.001 -0.010 0.010 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.012) (0.009) 
2 years before 0.003 0.000 -0.007 -0.000 -0.007 -0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.004) (0.017) (0.011) 
1 year before 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 0.002 -0.008 0.004 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.016) (0.004) (0.020) (0.013) 
Credit access yr 0.006 -0.005 0.014 0.012* 0.020 0.110*** 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.020) (0.006) (0.025) (0.020) 
1 year after -0.010 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.010 0.092*** 
 
(0.009) (0.016) (0.024) (0.007) (0.030) (0.020) 
2 years after 0.007 0.003 0.057** 0.024*** 0.080** 0.138*** 
 
(0.007) (0.016) (0.027) (0.007) (0.032) (0.026) 
3 years after -0.000 0.014 0.049* 0.016** 0.071** 0.106*** 
 
(0.008) (0.018) (0.027) (0.008) (0.033) (0.032) 
4 years after 0.003 -0.024 0.078** 0.031*** 0.085* 0.129*** 
 
(0.014) (0.024) (0.038) (0.008) (0.044) (0.044) 
education 0.004** 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.010** 0.005 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
age 0.000 -0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.002** 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
age-squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
retail trade -0.002 0.001 -0.019*** 0.005*** -0.012* -0.010 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
agric*retail -0.001 0.006 0.018** 0.006** 0.029*** 0.023** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant -0.013 0.046** 0.018 -0.008 0.051 0.050 
 
(0.010) (0.020) (0.027) (0.009) (0.035) (0.034) 
       Observations 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 
R-squared 0.014 0.027 0.051 0.012 0.070 0.024 
F-stat: post- vs. 
pre-treatment 0.000 0.04 9.02*** 10.93*** 78.23*** 39.55*** 
p-value 0.95 0.853 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.000 
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 2B: Fixed Effect OLS RETRAFECT Regression on Housing Improvement 
 
      --- Credit Availability Window --- 
Uptake 
Window 
 New New New New Any home Any home 
VARIABLES roof wall floor toilet improvement improvement 
              
4 years before -0.001 0.005* 0.002 -0.016*** -0.015* -0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
3 years before -0.000 0.007* -0.000 -0.036** -0.033* -0.018** 
 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.019) (0.009) 
2 years before -0.005 0.010** 0.003 -0.028*** -0.033* -0.012 
 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) 
1 year before -0.015 0.008 -0.002 -0.045*** -0.062*** -0.012 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.023) (0.011) 
Credit access year -0.020 0.007 -0.007 -0.035** -0.056** 0.048*** 
 
(0.017) (0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015) 
1 year after -0.012 0.014 -0.007 -0.029* -0.044* 0.073*** 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.024) (0.017) 
2 years after 0.016 0.006 -0.008 -0.011 0.005 0.052*** 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) 
3 years after 0.035** 0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.030 0.117*** 
 
(0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.028) 
4 years after 0.036 0.007 -0.006 0.008 0.043 0.036 
 
(0.027) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.033) (0.027) 
education -0.005* 0.001 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.008 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
age 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
age-squared -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
retail trade -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
agric*retail 0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -0.014 0.004 -0.016* -0.039** -0.047* -0.034 
 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) 
       Observations 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 
R-squared 0.027 0.011 0.018 0.039 0.042 0.014 
F-stat: post- vs. 
pre-treatment 2.35 0.01 0.55 6.31** 5.51** 15.4*** 
p-value 0.125 0.939 0.459 0.012 0.019 0.001 
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. 




Table 2C: FE OLS RETRAFECT Regression on Consumer Durables Purchase 
 
      --- Credit Availability Window --- 
Uptake 
Window 
 New New New New Any Any 
VARIABLES television bicycle cellphone stove Consumer  Consumer  
          Durable Durable 
4 years before 0.008 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.008 0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.005) (0.002) (0.014) (0.012) 
3 years before 0.004 -0.010 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.025* 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.002) (0.018) (0.015) 
2 years before 0.044*** 0.004 -0.000 0.006 0.040* 0.023 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.004) (0.023) (0.016) 
1 year before 0.034* 0.040** 0.002 0.005 0.079*** 0.031 
 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.005) (0.027) (0.019) 
Credit access yr 0.015 0.002 -0.009 0.003 0.002 0.092*** 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.007) (0.032) (0.023) 
1 year after 0.005 0.014 0.024 0.011 0.040 0.088*** 
 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.008) (0.036) (0.024) 
2 years after 0.001 0.072** 0.059** 0.017** 0.115*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.007) (0.041) (0.029) 
3 years after -0.024 0.029 0.016 0.002 0.020 0.092** 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.007) (0.037) (0.036) 
4 years after -0.029 0.050 0.015 -0.012 0.006 0.103** 
 
(0.037) (0.044) (0.045) (0.021) (0.064) (0.049) 
education 0.019*** 0.005 0.021*** 0.004* 0.034*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) 
age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.004** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
age-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
retail trade -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.009 -0.006 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009) 
agric*retail 0.010 0.016** 0.007 0.002 0.019 0.015 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.012) 
Constant 0.007 0.092*** -0.005 -0.008 0.086* 0.108** 
 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.020) (0.011) (0.045) (0.043) 
Observations 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 7,020 
R-squared 0.031 0.043 0.093 0.019 0.113 0.013 
F-stat: post- vs. 
pre-treatment 
2.98* 2.43 2.02 0.03 0.18 5.63** 
p-value 0.085 0.119 0.156 0.853 0.671 0.025 
Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. 






Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Estimations  
Take-Up, ITT, and instrumented ATT Estimations for 
Enterprise Investment, Housing Improvements, and Consumer Durables 
  New New New New New 
VARIABLES machines lands livestock store investments 
Microfinance Take-up 0.010** 0.037*** 0.095*** 0.020*** 0.149*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) 
Microfinance ITT 0.001 0.002 0.022*
† 0.008** 0.025*† 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.003) (0.015) 
Microfinance instrumented ATT 0.002 0.007 0.094*
† 0.033** 0.108*† 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.056) (0.013) (0.065) 
  New New New New All Home 
VARIABLES roof wall floor toilet Improvements 
Microfinance Take-up 0.046*** 0.004 0.010** 0.022*** 0.071*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) 
Microfinance ITT 0.009 0.000 -0.008 0.005 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) 
Microfinance instrumented ATT 0.039 0.001 -0.034 0.023 0.047 
 (0.049) (0.019) (0.031) (0.031) (0.059) 
  New New New New All Consumer 
VARIABLES televisions bicycles cell phone stove Durables 
Microfinance Take-up 0.027***
† 0.061*** 0.084*** 0.009**† 0.127*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.015) 
Microfinance ITT -0.033** -0.019 0.005 0.003 -0.047** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.004) (0.023) 
Microfinance instrumented ATT -0.145** -0.085 0.023 0.011 -0.204** 
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.048) (0.018) (0.100) 
Each cell gives a single impact coefficient.  Regressions include fixed effects at the region level and 
controls for education age, age2, and type of enterprise.  Clustered-robust standard errors at the 
household level in parentheses.   Credit availability instruments for take-up in instrumented ATT 
estimations (First-stage F-statistic = 95.33, p-value < 0.001).    













































Figures 1A-3B: Changes in Impact Variables, Before and After  
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APPENDIX:  CAUSAL INTERPRETATION OF RETRAFECT ESTIMATION 
The causal question of interest is how would the observed impact measure sequence {𝑌𝑡}𝑡=𝜏
𝑁  
change if a development program were to enter and remain in an area beginning in year 𝑡  
relative to no program access for this local population during the same sequence of time? 
We define the following notation so that we can analyze RETRAFECT estimation in a 
counterfactual framework. 
 𝑡 = 1,2, ⋯ , 𝑁 denotes the time period.  Note that we use N here because T has been 
used to indicate treatment in section 2. 
 𝐷𝑖
𝑡: a sequence of binary treatment history for individual  𝑖 up to time 𝑡. Note that the 
subscript here denotes the history up to time 𝑡. That is, 𝐷𝑖
𝑡 = (𝐷𝑖1, 𝐷𝑖2, ⋯ , 𝐷𝑖𝑡). 𝐷𝑖
𝑁 =
(𝐷𝑖1, 𝐷𝑖2, ⋯ , 𝐷𝑖𝑁), or the sequence of binary treatment for the whole period. 
 𝛿0
𝑁: reference treatment, 𝛿0
𝑁 = (0, 0, ⋯ , 0)𝑁×1. This is a particular realization of 𝐷𝑖
𝑁. 
 𝛿1
𝑁: comparison treatment, 𝛿1
𝑁 = (0, 0, ⋯ , 1, ⋯ , 1)𝑁×1, where 1 starts from year 𝑡. This 




1: potential outcomes for individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡 given reference treatment 
and comparison treatment, respectively, where 𝑡 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑁. Note that at most one of 
the potential outcomes can be observed for any individual 𝑖. 
 𝐷𝑖
𝑡−𝑘,𝑡+𝑘
: a sequence of binary treatment variables during the event window for 𝑡, where 
superscript (𝑡 − 𝑘, 𝑡 + 𝑘) implies the event window from period 𝑡 − 𝑘 to 𝑡 + 𝑘. That is, 
𝐷𝑖
𝑡−𝑘,𝑡+𝑘 = (𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑘, 𝐷𝑖𝑡−𝑘+1, ⋯ , 𝐷𝑖𝑡,  𝐷𝑖𝑡+1, 𝐷𝑖𝑡+𝑘). 
 ?̃?𝑖
𝑡: a sequence of the history of observed potential causes other than the treatment for 
individual  𝑖 up to time 𝑡. That is, ?̃?𝑖
𝑡 = (?̃?𝑖1, ?̃?𝑖2, ⋯ , ?̃?𝑖𝑡). 
 ?̈?𝑖
𝑡: a sequence of the history of unobserved potential causes other than the treatment for 
individual  𝑖 up to time 𝑡. That is, ?̈?𝑖
𝑡 = (?̈?𝑖1, ?̈?𝑖2, ⋯ , ?̈?𝑖𝑡). 
 𝑊𝑖
𝑡: a sequence of the history of observed proxies for individual  𝑖 up to time 𝑡. That is, 
𝑊𝑖
𝑡 = (𝑊𝑖1, 𝑊𝑖2, ⋯ , 𝑊𝑖𝑡). 
 ?̃?𝑖












Note that RETRAFECT assumes that only treatments within this event window can 
have effects on 𝑌𝑖𝑡.  Following the framework established in White (2006), the outcome is 
determined by a response function: 




𝑡   ),    (A1) 
where we assume that the outcome at time 𝑡 depends on 𝑖 and depends on the sequence of 
treatment realizations during the event window 𝑑𝑖
𝑡−𝑘,𝑡+𝑘
, the observed causes history ?̃?𝑖
𝑡 and 
the unobserved causes history ?̈?𝑖
𝑡. If we further assume that the outcome depends on 𝑖 only 
through the arguments of the response function, the functional form 𝑐 does not depend on 𝑖. 
Thus, 






       = 𝑐𝑡(𝑑𝑖
𝑡−𝑘,𝑡+𝑘, ?̃?𝑖
𝑡, ?̈?𝑖
𝑡   ).
    (A2) 
Given (?̃?𝑡, ?̈?𝑡), the effect of the event at time 𝑡 is 
              ∆𝑖𝑡(?̃?



























      (A3) 
At period 𝑡, the expected effect for treated for given 𝑥𝑖
𝑡 is 
  

























and {𝑊𝑖𝑡} are observable proxies. Note that ?̃?𝑖
𝑡 includes observed causes and proxies. 
For the estimation of 𝜇01𝑡, assuming the unconfoundedness condition 











𝑡).    (A5) 
Assuming only the contemporary values ?̃?𝑖𝑡 and ?̈?𝑖𝑡 affect the outcome, and the true 
relationship is a linear parametric one, i.e., 
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                          = ∑ 𝜏𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ?̃?𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + ?̈?𝑖𝑡
?̅?+𝑘
𝑡=?̅?−𝑘 ,
   (A6) 
Where ?̃?𝑖𝑡




          𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑡|𝐷𝑖
𝑡−𝑘,𝑡+𝑘, ?̃?𝑖
𝑡)
                                             = ?̃?𝑖𝑡






                           = ?̃?𝑖𝑡





                                  = ?̃?𝑖𝑡




′ 𝛾1 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾2
 
       = ?̃?𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + ∑ 𝜏𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡
?̅?+𝑘
𝑡=?̅?−𝑘 .      (A7) 
Thus, 𝜏𝑡 can be consistently estimated by RETRAFECT. 
Note that 
𝑌𝑖𝑡




′ 𝜃 + ?̈?𝑖𝑡 
and 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡




′ 𝜃 + ?̈?𝑖𝑡. 
So the causal effect at time 𝑡 would be 
    𝑌𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡
0 = ∑ 𝜏𝑡(𝛿1𝑖𝑡 − 𝛿0𝑖𝑡)
?̅?+𝑘
𝑡=?̅?−𝑘 .    (A8) 
Because the reference treatment and comparison treatment are known, and because we can 
estimate 𝜏𝑡, we can estimate the causal effect. 
In the setting of credit availability, 𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the treatment 𝐷𝑖𝑡, and we assume the effect 
lasts for up to 𝑘 periods after the initial availability. The effect from the treatment at 𝑡 + 1 to 
𝑡 + 𝑘 should be viewed as the effect from the expected treatment which is known at time 𝑡, and 
we assume the effect does not depend on the initial year that microfinance is available. 
 
